A Bill to Remove Ministers Held 30 Days in Custody Returns as Parliament's Monsoon Session Opens
Parliament meets from 20 July, and among the bills awaiting it is the Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, which would remove a Prime Minister, Chief Minister or minister who stays in custody for 30 consecutive days on serious charges. A joint committee scrutinising it is reported to be finalising its report.
The Indian Account desk · 2026-07-16
Parliament's monsoon session will run from 20 July to 13 August, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju has announced, with 19 sittings scheduled. Among the measures the government has flagged for the session is one of the more consequential constitutional questions before the current Parliament: the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, which would provide for removing senior office-holders who remain in custody for an extended period on serious criminal charges.
The Bill is a matter of public record, and it is worth stating its contents precisely, because the debate around it can outrun what it actually says. According to the legislative brief published by PRS Legislative Research, the Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 20 August 2025 and, together with two related bills, referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee for scrutiny.
The measure sets out a specific, two-part trigger. A minister — including the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister — would be liable to removal if, first, they are accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more, and second, they have been arrested and held in custody for 30 consecutive days. On the 31st day, removal follows: the President or a Governor may act on the advice of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister, or the removal takes effect automatically. A Prime Minister or Chief Minister is required to resign after 30 days in custody, failing which they cease to hold office the next day. The Bill also allows a person so removed to be re-appointed once released.
Two features define the design. The trigger is custody, not conviction — removal can occur while a case is still unproven in court. And it is time-bound and automatic rather than discretionary, which its drafters present as a safeguard against selective enforcement but which critics read the opposite way.
The argument for the Bill is one of propriety: that a government cannot credibly be run from a jail cell, and that a person unable to discharge the duties of high office because they are in prolonged detention should not continue to hold it. On this view the measure closes a gap in which a minister might govern in name while physically unable to function, and does so by a clear, mechanical rule rather than case-by-case judgement.
The argument against turns on the same feature. Because arrest and remand are decided by investigating agencies and courts before any finding of guilt, opposition parties have argued that the provision could be used to unseat elected leaders through the timing of arrests rather than through the ballot or a conviction — in their framing, a route to remove non-aligned governments. Supporters respond that the joint committee is expected to build in safeguards against exactly that risk. Both positions are on the record; the resolution depends on detail that is not yet public.
The immediate procedural question is the joint committee's report. That committee, chaired by BJP MP Aparajita Sarangi, has been examining the Bill, and its report is reported likely to be finalised around 17 July, shortly before the session opens. This desk notes that, as of the edition date, the report had not been published; accounts of what it will contain — including whether the core 30-day provision is retained and what safeguards are added — rest on reporting rather than on a filed document, and should be read as anticipation, not fact.
The higher bar comes after that. A constitutional amendment cannot pass on a simple majority: it requires a two-thirds majority of members present and voting in each House, and for certain provisions the ratification of state legislatures. That threshold, not the committee stage, is where a measure of this kind is ultimately tested. What to watch, in order, is the committee's report when it is tabled, the specific text the government brings to the floor, and whether the numbers in both Houses are there to carry it.